The Demise of Zeelandia
In the mid-16th century European
colonial missions were becoming commonplace on the Asian coast lines in an
effort to secure profitable control of Asian trade routes (Spice Trade, 2015).
The drive was led by the Portuguese and Spanish, and later followed by the
Dutch who joined the battle for territory. The Dutch established the port
of Batavia in 1619, which was to serve as the new headquarters of the Dutch East
India Company; VOC (Fitzsimons, 2011).
In pursuing more territory, they tried unsuccessfully to take the
established Spanish and Portuguese trading post at Macau (Oosterhoff, 1984). In
retreat, they established a post on a small island sand bar named Tayouan on
the south west island of Formosa (now Taiwan) subsequently establishing the
Castle of Zeelandia in 1624. J.L.
Oosterhoff in his work Zeelandia, a Dutch
Colonial City on Formosa (1624-1662) tells the story of the foundation and
eventual demise of the VOC colony. This paper will attempt to deconstruct
the failures of Zeelandia whilst drawing comparison to
the colonising methods of other “successful” colonies.
Figure 1: Fort Zeelandia [painting on parchment]. (1625 - 1660). Anonymous.
Retrieved from Atlas of Mutual Heritage, http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/en/View-fort-Zeelandia.5657.
Most often colonial cities are grouped
into two categories. The first type consists of an outside administration
becoming established in an area that had no prior settlement. Here, the colonizers most often
outnumber existing populations. An
example of this is the British settlement of Australia. The second type
of colony is established by an outside administration in an existing
settlement, often assuming a control of a geographically advantaged site with
an ample supply of available labour (Knox & Marston, 2009). The
settlement of Formosa is somewhat of an anomaly. It suits the first
category in the sense that it was only sparsely populated by indigenous peoples
and Chinese fisherman, allowing the Dutch to create the new colony ex
nihilio, out of nothing. However the Formosan settlement strays from
this category in its sourcing of the ample supply of “poor laborious people”
from the Chinese empire to serve its colony (Oosterhoff 1984, p.54). Imported
slave labour was not a novel idea in colonialism although African slaves of
course were crucial to the colonization of the Americas (Bernstein, 2000). Where the Formosan experience differs
is that the Chinese labourers were not persuaded by force.
It is important to distinguish that
this colony was valuable to the Dutch primarily for its prime geographical
location between Japan, China and the Philippines (Oosterhoff, 1984). Of
course, the need for subsistence farming was a necessity on any colony, but it
was only after early successes of sugar and rice crops that the Dutch saw the opportunity
to cultivate the land for profit. Working in association with Chinese
businessmen, they posted signs to attract the Chinese, guaranteeing land for
farming, payment for sugar and rice crops, and exemption from taxes for four
years (Andrade, 2006). The Chinese settled the island in great numbers,
and a city was established next to the castle. By 1648, over 20,000
Chinese residents lived on Formosa. At first the Dutch worked with
Chinese merchants to facilitate tax collection, but over time the traditional
Chinese system of rural organization emerged and cabessas, men of wealth
and authority, were appointed from within the farming community. These cabessas
were responsible for the welfare of their people as well as tax collection
to be remitted to the Dutch. The collection of real estate taxes, duties
on fishing, rice and sugar, and poll taxes proved profitable to both the
Chinese merchants and the Dutch, who amassed their profits with little direct
involvement in the management of the land (Oosterhoff, 1984). It is this
Chinese organisation of people on Dutch controlled territory by which Tonio
Andrade (2006) argues that Formosa developed a system of “cooperative
colonisation”, a Chinese colony held under Dutch rule.
Leonard Blusée (1979, p.211) argues
that the “mercantilist policy of the VOC emphasising agricultural development
of export crops” led to significant demographic changes in Asia, yet it seems
that on Formosa, the Chinese maintained their own sophisticated systems of
agricultural management. With the similarities in the grid plans of
Chinese and Dutch towns, both on a chessboard pattern, it would be easy for the
Dutch to wrongly assume that the Chinese had similar commercial motivations to
themselves. The Dutch espoused the grid plan as the most ideal form for
growth and economic prosperity, and early explorations had revealed thriving
commerce within the Chinese grid. However the Dutch failed to observe the
greater role of the Chinese grid as a tool of administrative and political
regulation (Kostoff, 1991).
Unlike the Dutch cities where merchants had become the ruling class, the Chinese city was one of unwavering hierarchy focused on sovereign authority. Trade and commerce were of little concern in the Chinese system, where merchants predominantly held low social rank and were strictly governed by the state (Kostoff, 1991; Oosterhoff, 1984). The Dutch, in interpreting the commonalities in urban form, may have wrongly assumed a likeness in mercantile motivations of the Chinese people, based on their past knowledge and experiences. As Kevin Lynch notes, “so various are the individual meanings of a city” (1960, p.9).
Unlike the Dutch cities where merchants had become the ruling class, the Chinese city was one of unwavering hierarchy focused on sovereign authority. Trade and commerce were of little concern in the Chinese system, where merchants predominantly held low social rank and were strictly governed by the state (Kostoff, 1991; Oosterhoff, 1984). The Dutch, in interpreting the commonalities in urban form, may have wrongly assumed a likeness in mercantile motivations of the Chinese people, based on their past knowledge and experiences. As Kevin Lynch notes, “so various are the individual meanings of a city” (1960, p.9).
For some time the Dutch were under the
misconception that they were heading a peaceful colony of obedient peoples
(Strydom, 2003). This is not to imply that there was no use of force or
coercion to maintain this peace. Early on, the local Aborigines had been
subdued by military action. The rule of the Dutch was further imposed on
the native Formosans by missionary work and education, and the fabrication of
rituals such which served to inflate and assert the Dutch authority.
Through this allegiance, the Dutch were also able to impose a divide
between the Aborigines and the Chinese, in an effort to eliminate alliances.
The Dutch had few tools in place to control the Chinese and in 1652 they
revolted. The deaths of 3000 to 4000 Chinese, the colony was brought back
under control, but the end of Dutch rule was imminent. In 1661 when
Chinese warrior Zheng Cheng-Zong of the Ming Dynasty came to overthrow Formosa
he was strongly supported by the Chinese who had been so long repressed by the
Dutch (Strydom, 2003).
Oosterhoff argues that the success of
Zeelandia was in part to blame for its failure, and to this point I disagree.
If the colony of Zeelandia was successful, the Dutch would have asserted
control over their colonized populations. But rather than becoming a
captive and submissive workforce, the Chinese maintained strong family
relations, and an ongoing connection to their homeland. In the end, the
Dutch did not have sufficient military defence or control over their colonized
people to prevent them from supporting an alternative ruler.
Reference List
Andrade, T. (2006). The Rise and Fall
of Dutch Taiwan, 1624-1662: Cooperative
Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion. Journal of
World History, 17(4), 429-450.
Bernstein, H. (2000). ‘Colonialism,
capitalism, development’ in (Eds.) T. Allen & A.
Thomas, Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Blusee, L. (1979). The Source
Publications of the Daghregisters (Journals) of Zeelandia
Castle at Taiwan (Formosa) 1629 -
1662: An Interim Report. Cina 2, pp. 204-212.
Fitzsimons, P. (2011). Batavia:
Betrayal, Shipwreck, Murder, Sexual Slavery, Courage: a
Spine-Chilling Chapter in
Australian History. North Sydney, N.S.W.: William
Heinemann.
Fort Zeelandia [painting on parchment].
(1625 - 1660). Anonymous. Retrieved from
Atlas of Mutual Heritage, http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/en/View-fort-Zeelandia.5657.
Knox, P.L. & Marston S.A. (2009).
Urbanisation. In P.L. Knox & S.A. Marston Human
Geography: Places and Regions in
a Global Context (pp. 389-421). New Jersey:
Prentice Hall.
Kostoff, S. (1991). The Grid. In S.
Kostoff, The City Shaped (pp. 95-123). London:
Thames and Hudson.
Oosterhoff, J.L. (1984). Zeelandia, a
Dutch Colonial City on Formosa (1624 - 1662). In
R. R. Ross and G.J. Telkamp (eds) Colonial Cities Dordrecht (pp.
51 - 63). Netherlands: Springer.
Spice Trade. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2015). Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/559803/spice-trade.
Strydom, M. (2003). Pride and
Prejudice: The Role of Policy and Perception Creation in
the Chinese Revolt of 1652 on
Dutch Formosa. Itinerario, 27(2), 17-36.

No comments:
Post a Comment